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SUMMARY
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is publishing a series of memorandums that
describe the role that foreign aid has played in the development of various countries.
The memorandums illustrate the broad themes identified in CBO's May 1997 study
The Role of Foreign Aid in Development. The countries are studied in pairs: South
Korea and the Philippines, Costa Rica and Honduras, and Botswana and Zambia.
This memorandum examines the development history of South Korea and the
Philippines. Although both countries have received substantial amounts of foreign
assistance, South Korea has been relatively more successful in achieving long-term
economic and social development.
In I960, the Philippines was slightly richer than South Korea. The
Philippines had a slightly larger per capita gross national product (GNP) and a far
larger base of natural resources. By the 1990s, however, Korea's per capita GNP was
three times greater than that of the Philippines. In addition, South Korea's social
indicators have shown greater improvement.
Many different factors explain the divergence in development between South
Korea and the Philippines. Some are unique to the individual countries. But what
seemed to matter most was that the political and economic policies of South Korea
over the past 30 years were much more favorable to long-term growth and
development than those of the Philippines. Foreign aid helped South Korea's
development somewhat, but it arguably hindered the Philippines' development by
reinforcing the government's political and economic policies.
The most important period in South Korea's development began after the fall
of the regime of Syngman Rhee in 1960. General Park Chung Hee, who took over
in a military coup in 1961, instituted a process of economic reform. He devalued the
currency, reformed interest rates, imposed tighter fiscal policies, lowered trade
barriers, and, especially, put in place a number of incentives to encourage exports.
In many ways, South Korea's exports were the central driver of its successful
development. The government has maintained a relatively open, market-based
economy ever since. In addition, the government has been stable and a competent
administrator, with only relatively modest amounts of corruption.
Foreign aid after 1960 contributed to South Korea's successful development.
It provided an extra pool of capital that the economy used for saving and investment.
The Agency for International Development (AID) provided extensive technical
support to the officials and agencies responsible for South Korea's export drive. U.S.
military aid helped Korea with its defense needs and thus possibly freed up some
resources that could be used for development rather than for the military. Foreign

assistance also helped improve South Korea's health, education, and agriculture
sectors.
In contrast, the election of Ferdinand Marcos as the Philippine president in
1966 led the country down a path that was ultimately counterproductive to long-term
development. Marcos pursued more inward-oriented economic policies than those
pursued by South Korea. Marcos's policies produced aggregate economic growth
initially, but in the 1980s the Philippine economy experienced a severe crisis, leading
to substantial declines in per capita GNP. Moreover, the average rural or urban
worker was far worse off at the end of the Marcos era than at its start. Corruption
and self-aggrandizement on the part of Marcos and his family and friends contributed
to the economy's problems. Reforms under Marcos's successors—Corazon Aquino
and Fidel Ramos—have made some progress in reversing the damage done by the
Marcos era, but the Philippines' future, though promising, remains uncertain.
The record of foreign aid to the Philippines is mixed. On the one hand,
foreign aid contributed to some of the improvement in the social indicators,
particularly those for health and education. On the other hand, to the extent that $33
billion in foreign assistance (in 1997 dollars) to Marcos perpetuated his hold on
power, it undermined the Philippines' long-term development. Much of that money
was apparently lost, wasted, or diverted by the Marcos government. However,
foreign assistance has apparently helped the Philippines emerge from the problems
created during the Marcos era.
IX

INTRODUCTION
This memorandum is one of several to be published by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) on various developing countries and the role that foreign aid has
played in their development. CBO has published a study titled The Role of Foreign
Aid in Development (May 1997). Through a broad review of the academic and policy
literature on development, that study attempts to identify the conditions that seem to
foster development and the role that foreign aid plays in that process. It also
highlights the general themes gleaned from the literature with illustrations from eight
developing countries: South Korea and the Philippines, Costa Rica and Honduras,
Botswana and Zambia, and Tunisia and Egypt. This memorandum examines the
development history of South Korea and the Philippines. Although both countries
have received substantial amounts of foreign assistance, South Korea has been
relatively more successful in achieving long-term economic and social development
than has the Philippines.
South Korea and the Philippines have two very different development
histories. In I960, the Philippines was the richer country. If one had polled
development experts to ask which country was more likely to achieve the higher rate
of growth over the next 30 years, most would probably have named the Philippines.
In reality, few other developing countries have matched South Korea's rate of growth
and overall success in development since the end of World War II, whereas the
Philippines has grown much more slowly.
South Korea is the smaller country. In 1996, it had a population of 45
million, occupying 98,000 square kilometers of land. The Philippines had 75 million
people living on an archipelago of nearly 300,000 square kilometers. The
Philippines has a larger and more diverse base of natural resources. South Korea has
a temperate climate; the Philippines' is tropical.
Furthermore, although both countries have relatively homogeneous ethnic
populations, South Korea has more religious diversity. Nearly 96 percent of the
Philippines is Malay, and South Korea is almost completely Korean. Most Filipinos
are Christian, but South Koreans are divided fairly equally between Christians and
Buddhists.
The development histories of both countries also point to significant
differences. In 1960, the Philippines was still the richer of the two; its per capita
gross national product (GNP), measured in 1994 dollars, was $911 compared with
$800 for South Korea. By 1992, not only had that situation reversed, but the chasm
between the two was enormous. South Korea's per capita GNP was three times
greater than that of the Philippines (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA FOR SOUTH KOREA AND
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the World Bank and the University of Pennsylvania.

South Korea has made greater progress than the Philippines in other areas
over the past 30 years. South Korea's infant mortality and fertility rates have fallen
faster than those in the Philippines (see Table 1). Only a small fraction of either
country's population has been illiterate since the late 1960s, although South Korea
has had slightly higher literacy rates.
A variety of factors contributed to the separate paths that South Korea and the
Philippines have taken. As would be true in any case, unique cultural and societal
influence played a role. But the political and economic management of each country
probably mattered as well. South Korea, for the most part, pursued outward-oriented
economic policies and experienced only moderate corruption; the Philippines
pursued inward-oriented economic policies, accompanied by massive corruption.
Both countries received large quantities of U.S. and other international assistance.
Depending on when and how it was given, foreign aid seemed to have a positive or
negative effect in each case.
SOUTH KOREA'S HISTORICAL LEGACIES
South Korea is perhaps the preeminent development success story of the post-World
War II era. In 40 years, it moved from being a war-torn, agrarian economy to a
modern industrialized economy. Many cultural, political, and economic factors
contributed to that outcome. Although most of the story revolves around political
and economic management between 1953 and 1973, ignoring the legacies of
Confucianism, the Japanese occupation, and the Korean War would distort the
picture of South Korea's development.
Historically, Korea has been a stable and centralized society. It began its
political existence as a unified, independent state around the 7th century A.D. and
remained that way until Japan made it a colony in 1910. Since being freed from
Japanese rule in 1945, Korea has been divided politically between the communist
North and the capitalist South.
For centuries, Korea's outside contacts were mostly with China. As a result,
the state philosophy of Korea became Confucianism. Two important legacies of that
cultural influence were a "great emphasis on education and on a deference within the
family, within the community, and within the society that tends to favor individual
discipline and social stability."1 Education was the route to prestige and employment
Edward S. Mason and others, The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 446.

TABLE 1. SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES,
1967 and 1992
1967
Indicator
Infant Mortality Rate"
Literacy6
Fertility Rate'
Calorie Consumptionf
South Korea
58
88e
4.5
2,547
Philippines
72
83C
6.0
1,802
1992
South Korea
11
96"
1.7
3,285
Philippines
44
90"
3.9
2,255
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the World Bank and the Agency for International
Development.
a. Deaths of infants under one year per 1,000 live births.
b. Percentage of literate people in the population over the age of 15.
c. Value is for 1970; value for 1967 is unavailable.
d. Value is for 1990; value for 1992 is unavailable.
e. Births per woman.
f. Per capita per day.

in the government bureaucracy, and many people in Korean society achieved literacy.
The labor force became industrious and productive.
Another important legacy of Korea's long history is that it is one of the most
ethnically homogenous nations in the world. This lack of social segmentation was
beneficial: there were no ethnic impediments to development, no groups were
disenfranchised, and no ethnic scores had to be settled. Education could be focused
and the population mobilized with relative ease. In addition, no linguistic barriers
existed to impede education or development.2
In some ways, the Japanese occupation of Korea between 1910 and 1945 may
have aided Korea's later development. Japan's contributions included building
infrastructure such as railroads, creating a modern monetary system, and establishing
an agricultural extension service. It also built a manufacturing base in Korea to
support the economic needs of Japan. The Japanese, however, dominated ownership,
management, and the technical aspects of the manufacturing base, which ultimately
limited the transfer of knowledge to Korea. But the Koreans who did learn
something about those processes—both in Korea and as expatriates in
Japan—brought their experience in a growing, export-driven economy to the postwar
development process.3
The Japanese, also influenced by Confucianism, continued and strengthened
the emphasis on education in Korean society. The Japanese considered an educated
Korean population to be a prerequisite for their integration into the Japanese Empire.
At the highest rungs of the educational ladder, a small number of students were
educated, but compared with the experience of other countries ruled by different
colonial powers, the number was still high.
Yet in other ways, Japan's occupation impeded Korea's development. When
the Japanese left in 1945, much of the institutional and manufacturing apparatus was
either changed or made unusable because trained and experienced personnel were no
longer there to run it. The bitter experience of Japanese colonial rule soured political
and economic relations with Japan into the 1960s. For example, during their
occupation, the Japanese excluded Koreans from political activity and government.
When the Koreans finally had to govern their own country, they were not sure how
to do it. That contributed to the political instability of the 1940s and 1950s. As one
2. David I. Steinberg, Foreign Aid and the Development of the Republic of Korea: The Effectiveness of
Concessional Assistance, AID Special Study No. 42 (Agency for International Development, October
1985), pp. 9-10.
3. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, pp. 77-79.

report puts it, "at a crucial point in Korean history, Koreans had been deprived of the
opportunity to develop effective political institutions of their own."4
The Korean War greatly harmed the development enterprise and destroyed
a large part of the industrial base. It helped make what was supposed to be a
temporary political division in 1945 permanent. But as a result, the energy sources
and remaining heavy industry were concentrated in the North, and the light industry
and agriculture resided mostly in the South. The fear of another attack by the North
caused South Korea to devote enormous resources to its defense, maintaining one of
the largest armies in the world. Military influence permeated Korean society, which
contributed to the coup of 1961 and the repressive nature of most South Korean
governments since 1953.5
INFLUENCE OF GOVERNANCE ON SOUTH KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT
During the past 40 years, South Korea's governance—from a developmental
perspective—has been better than that of most countries. Although sometimes
suffering from internal corruption, the South Korean government has shown the
political will to carry out land reform and institute economic and social policies that
promote development.
The Structure of Government
South Korea's government from 1953 to 1988 was mostly stable but largely
authoritarian. Syngman Rhee ruled South Korea with an iron fist in the 1950s.6 All
power flowed to and from his hands. Rhee was determined to unify the peninsula.
Consequently, he was reluctant to invest in industries and activities, such as power
generation and fertilizer, that existed in the North, because that would duplicate
resources that he assumed he would eventually control once the country was
reunited. Rhee was driven from power in 1960 by a student-led revolution.7
4. Ibid., p. 451.
5. Ibid., pp. 86-93.
6. Following convention, CBO puts the family name first for Korean names. The only exceptions are
Syngman Rhee, who is best known in the United States with the family name last, and authors of
books who are Korean and have placed their family name last.
7. Steinberg, Foreign Aid and the Development of Korea, p. 22.
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After a brief flowering of democracy, a military coup led by General Park
Chung Hee took power in 1961. The coup was actually met with relief among many
segments of Korean society. It put an end to the disorder and civil strife that had
marked Korean politics since the last days of the Rhee regime. The Park government
tried to institute a technocratic government that focused primarily on promoting
economic and social development. A new constitution was drawn up in 1963. Under
that document, the executive was extremely powerful and the legislature was weak.
The trappings of democracy were few. In terms of growth and development,
however, the Park government was a successful administration. South Korea's
economy took off under Park's leadership.
The governmental structure Park created gave him a number of advantages.
First, the military strongly backed the government. Many former officers staffed
government ministries and public enterprises. Second, the government was able to
implement policy changes that were in the national interest with almost no
opposition. Those changes included periodic devaluations, which are often
unpopular in developing countries. During the oil crisis of 1973, the government
introduced conservation measures—quadrupling the price of gasoline—with little
opposition. Third, government policy kept organized labor weak, and strikes were
unknown. "Consequently, South Korea has avoided the pressure from organized
labor that in many Third World countries has maintained urban wages at artificially
high levels, has led to the overstaffing of public enterprises, and has frequently
seriously disrupted production."8
In recent years, South Korea has evolved toward a more democratic system.
After 19 years in power, President Park was assassinated in 1979; his ultimate
replacement was another general, Chung Doo Hwan. As South Korea grew richer
in the 1980s, the Korean people increasingly demanded more democracy. Roh Tae
Woo, another army officer, replaced Chung in 1987. He recognized the growing
strength of the democratic movement and merged his party organization with several
other parties. Under that new organization, Kim Young Sam was elected president
in 1992.
Corruption
Corruption under both Rhee and Park was significant, although hard data on its
extent do not exist. Still, corruption in the 1950s was more detrimental than that in
later years because of the economic policies pursued by the Rhee government.
8. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 487.
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Corruption under Rhee took the form of payoffs from foreign aid funds and
bank loans. "Inflation, an overvalued exchange rate, low interest rates, and elaborate
government controls formed an environment in which such corruption operated
profitably for those involved but to the detriment of sound investments or national
economic development."9
In contrast, corruption under Park took the form of payoffs from private
investment. But the payoffs took place in an economic environment more favorable
to growth. Thus, the private capital—"despite payoffs and the like—fed an invest-
ment boom that followed reasonably accurate market indicators of real benefits and
costs for the country."10 Investments approved by the government, even though
payoffs were extracted from them, had been tested and approved through feasibility
studies and were generally consistent with Korea's economic plan.11
Education
The government's emphasis on education throughout the postwar period greatly
aided the country's economic transformation. In 1945, almost 87 percent of the
population was illiterate. That is no longer true, largely because the government has
provided six years of free and compulsory education. By 1970, illiteracy had been
reduced to 12 percent.
Moreover, enrollment at the secondary level now compares well with that in
the advanced industrial countries. But the government cannot claim credit for that
improvement. The average family usually must pay out of their own pocket to
continue their children's education beyond the primary level. The willingness of the
Korean people to make that sacrifice is especially evident in national education
expenditures. The government spends about 3.5 percent of GDP on education.
Private spending, however, has brought the total spending on education to 9 percent
of GNP.12 According to one study, increased education per worker accounted for
9. David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and
Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 252.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Lawrence J. Lau, ed., Models of Development: A Comparative Study of Economic Growth in South
Korea and Taiwan (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990), pp. 131-132.
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nearly 5 percent of South Korea's growth between 1963 and 1982, a rate higher than
Japan's over a comparable period.13
Land Reform
Another major reform that the government directed was the redistribution of land that
Korean landlords held at the end of World War II. Although most of that process
took place between 1945 and 1953, it played an important role in Korea's
development history. Lands owned by departing Japanese and large estates were
broken up and distributed among small tenant farmers by the U.S. military
government. But the newly elected Korean government in 1949 imposed land reform
on Korean landlords on terms that one study described as "expropriation."14 In 1945,
48 percent of families owned land. After land reform was completed, that figure rose
to above 90 percent. That change had two important effects. It aided the
equalization and distribution of wealth; South Korea's later growth was characterized
by a high degree of equity. In addition, class tensions were largely diffused,
eliminating a potential source of political instability. Moreover, agricultural
production did not suffer in the process. Between 1954 and 1975, "the trend rate of
growth of agricultural value added was about 3.5 percent per annum."15
Economic Leadership
Perhaps the most important role of South Korea's government has been its leadership
in directing economic growth and development. In the 1950s under Syngman Rhee,
the government pursued policies that in retrospect proved counterproductive. After
Rhee's overthrow, however, the Park government adopted economic policies that
were conducive to development. The South Korean government largely initiated,
directed, and organized development by setting goals, establishing priorities, and
backing them up with resources. Large, highly profitable private companies were
clearly subordinate to the government, in part because the government controlled
domestic credit as well as the right to borrow abroad.16 It relied heavily on an
outward-looking, export-oriented economic strategy, but not exclusively. In certain
13. Kim Kwang-suk and Park Joon-kyung, Sources of Economic Growth in Korea: 1963-1982 (Seoul:
Korea Development Institute, 1985), p. 169.
14. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 10.
15. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
16. Ibid., p. 486.
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sectors, such as rice production and heavy and defense-related industries, the
government maintained a predominantly import-substitution strategy.
A good example of the government's leadership in the economy was its
management of public enterprises. Under Park, those organizations were efficiently
run and contributed to government resources, partly because of the sheer
determination of the political leadership to generate growth and to reform anything
that might be a drag on the economy. "In Korea, there have been numerous cases of
divestiture, most notably in the 1967-1969 period. And if a Korean public enterprise
considered important for development shows signs of becoming moribund, it is likely
to be vigorously kicked back into life by drastic changes in management and
operating procedures."17 For example, the government asked a private firm to
manage Korean Air Lines when it was not profitable as a public endeavor.
INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICIES
ON SOUTH KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT
The end of the Korean War left the South Korean economy in a devastated condition.
The economy's infrastructure was severely damaged. Inflation was high, and the
predominantly agrarian economy was constricted by an elaborate system of exchange
controls and multiple exchange rates. The primary sector—agriculture, mining, and
natural resources—accounted for 50 percent of GNP, and manufacturing represented
a little more than 5 percent. Investment accounted for 12 percent of GNP, and the
domestic saving rate was less than 7 percent. Foreign savings, mostly foreign aid,
represented about 5 percent of GNP.
After the end of the Korean War, the first priority of the Rhee government
was economic reconstruction, undertaken largely with foreign assistance.18 The
government kept interest rates low to accelerate investment, believing that domestic
saving was not very responsive to changes in interest rates. Industrial policy
followed an inward-looking, import-substitution strategy. High tariffs and quotas
were used to protect domestic industry. The exchange rate was kept overvalued
throughout the 1950s.19 Promoting exports was a low priority. Exports in 1954
accounted for less than 1 percent of GNP. By 1962, they were still only 2 percent of
17. Ibid., p. 275.
18. Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park, "External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in South
Korea," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, Developing Country Debt and Economic
Performance, vol. 3, Country Studies—Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 166.
19. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 95.
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GNP. The government was most concerned with reconstruction and price
stabilization.20 Largely as a result of the reconstruction effort, the economy grew, but
high inflation was the price.21
Policy Reform and Market Liberalization
By the late 1950s, Rhee's government began to recognize that the United States
would not provide high levels of foreign assistance indefinitely and that policy
reforms were necessary. The first step the government took was to tighten monetary
and fiscal policies to bring inflation under control. Between 1953 and 1957, inflation
averaged 31 percent a year, as measured by the implicit price deflator for GNP. After
the tightening, the rate of inflation fell to 3.7 percent between 1957 and I960.22
The new Park government made economic growth its first priority. Park
changed the industrialization strategy to outward-looking, export-led growth.
Perhaps the most important aspect of that effort was a large devaluation of the
exchange rate.23 The government also put in place a number of incentives—such as
subsidies, access to subsidized credit, and rights to import goods duty-free—to
promote exports. The government assured exporters that it would not allow the
domestic rate of inflation to harm the real rate of return on their exports.24 The
government also reformed the national currency, the budget, and tax collections. It
adopted the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-1966). The plan
called for an ambitious growth rate—7.1 percent annually—adjusted for inflation.
In the mid-1960s, the Park government continued with reforms designed to
promote exports and economic growth. The exchange rate was devalued again in
May 1964, and in March 1965 the government adopted a floating exchange rate
system. Interest rates on bank deposits and loans were doubled to increase private
saving and to discourage wasteful credit. In 1967, the government introduced
measures to liberalize imports and lower tariffs. The government did not pay much
20. Collins and Park, "External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in South Korea," p. 166.
21. Ibid., pp. 168-169.
22. Ibid., p. 169.
23. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 96.
24. Anne O. Krueger and Vernon W. Ruttan, "Assistance to Korea," in Anne O. Krueger, Constantine
Michalopoulos, and Vernon W. Ruttan, eds., Aid and Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989), p. 229.
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attention to agriculture, however, although it did force farmers to accept a policy of
low grain prices.
The First Five-Year Plan was succeeded by the Second (1967-1971), Third
(1972-1976), and Fourth (1977-1981). In each case, the overall strategy was
essentially the same: promote economic development through export-led growth.
Specific policies were modified as necessary to ensure that South Korea's growth
remained on track. In 1969, for example, the government began offering farmers
prices for their grain products that were high enough to ensure a respectable return.
The intent of that policy was to improve the environment of the farm village and
increase agricultural production and income.25
The South Korean economy was transformed between 1962 and 1982. The
primary sector of the economy fell from 45 percent of GNP to 19 percent (see Table
2). Manufacturing, on the other hand, grew from 9 percent of GNP to 34 percent.26
Economic growth paralleled the rise of manufacturing in the economy. Between
1963 and 1976, GNP grew by 10.3 percent a year. Per capita growth was equally
impressive at 7.2 percent a year. Those developments were largely financed by the
dramatic rise in domestic saving that government policies had promoted. Domestic
saving represented only 3.3 percent of GNP in 1962—half the rate of 1954. By 1982,
however, the saving rate exceeded 21 percent of GNP.
Exports grew dramatically in quantity and variety. In 1962, exports
accounted for only 2 percent of GNP. That percentage climbed to 16.4 percent in
1972 and to nearly 32 percent in 1982. The change in the number of countries to
which Korea exported was particularly astonishing. In 1954, Korea exported to 5
countries. By 1976, it was exporting to 175 countries. According to one study, the
expansion of exports accounted for 31.8 percent of the growth in Korea's industrial
output between 1963 and 1975. Import substitution claimed only 3.7 percent. In
contrast, over the 1955-1963 period, when Korea was still dominated by Rhee's
policies, the expansion of exports accounted for 9.2 percent of growth in industrial
output and import substitution for 16.5 percent.27
Still, the development process between 1962 and 1982 was not completely
smooth. The oil shocks in the 1970s created some bumps in the road with which the
government had to contend. The government-directed industrialization also created
25. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, pp. 96-97. See also Collins and
Park, "External Debt and Macroeconomic Performance in South Korea," pp. 184-185.
26. Kim and Park, Sources of Economic Growth in Korea, p. 9.
27. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, pp. 152-153.
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TABLE 2. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ECONOMY,
1954-1982 (As a percentage of gross national product)
Primary Sector1
Manufacturing
Social Overhead and Services
Exports
Imports
Domestic Investment
Domestic Saving
Foreign Saving
1954
51.1
5.3
43.6
0.8
7.2
11.9
6.6
5.3
1962
45.3
9.1
45.6
2.0
15.6
12.8
3.3
10.7
1972
29.2
20.9
49.9
16.4
23.7
21.7
15.7
5.2
1982
19.2
34.2
46.6
31.8
36.5
26.2
21.5
4.8
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Kim Kwang-suk and Park Joon-kyung, Sources of
Economic Growth in Korea: 1963-1982 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1985).
a. Agriculture and natural resources.
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problems. In the 1970s, for example, the government decided to create and expand
heavy industry. But in doing so, it created shortages in light industries and consumer
goods, leading to steep inflation. Those decisions did not prove particularly
detrimental, however, as they had in many other developing countries. The strength
and diversity of the economy by the 1970s allowed it to weather the government's
mistakes and external shocks.
A Modern Economy
South Korea today is by most accounts a modern industrial economy. Under
President Park's successors—Chung Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and Kim Young
Sam—South Korea continued along its outward-looking, export-oriented path to
industrialization and growth. It suffered a minor setback in the worldwide recession
in the early 1980s but quickly reestablished its rapid economic growth. It now is at
the top of the World Bank's list of upper-middle-income countries. Table 3
illustrates Korea's emergence as a modern industrial economy, comparing several
economic and social indicators with those of Japan in 1993.
ROLE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH KOREA'S DEVELOPMENT
After fighting a war to defend South Korea, the United States had a strong interest
in avoiding that country's political or economic collapse and the possibility of a
communist revolution in South Korea. Consequently, the United States poured aid
into Korea. Indeed, of the eight countries the Congressional Budget Office studied
in depth, South Korea was second only to Egypt in the amount of U.S. aid received.
That aid included large flows of military and economic support as well as substantial
technical assistance (see Figure 2). The form that aid took varied over time: between
1953 and 1970, most U.S. economic assistance was in the form of grants; after 1970,
most aid was in the form of concessional loans; by 1975, most U.S. assistance
consisted of loans from the Export-Import Bank.
Other donors began giving assistance to South Korea in the 1960s. The
World Bank—a major multilateral donor to Korea—first sent aid in 1962. In 1965,
Japan began giving money to Korea. Finally, the Asian Development Bank began
lending to Korea in 1968. Other donors, including the United Nations and the
Federal Republic of Germany, have given smaller amounts of money.28
28. Steinberg, Foreign Aid and the Development of Korea, pp. 31-33.
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TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF VARIOUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS
FOR SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN, 1994
Indicator
Real GNP per Capita (Dollars)
Manufacturing as a Percentage of GDP
Agriculture as a Percentage of GDP
Energy Use per Capita*
Adult Illiteracy
Total Fertility Rate (Births per woman)
Infant Mortality Ratec
Urban Population as a Percentage of Total Population
South Korea
10,330
29
7
3,000
b
1.8
12
80
Japan
21,130
27
2
3,825
b
1.5
4
78
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the World Bank.
NOTE: GNP = gross national product; GDP = gross domestic product.
a. Kilograms of oil equivalent.
b. The World Bank reports this number as "less than 5 percent."
c. Deaths of infants under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births.
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FIGURE 2. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO SOUTH KOREA, 1953-1993
Biffions of 1997 Dollars
2 -
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1983 1988 1993
(gg) U.S. Economic Aid ^  U.S. Military Aid Q Other U.S. Aid
Q Multilateral Aid g Other Bilateral Aidgn Use of IMF Credit
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Agency for International Development, the World Bank,
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
NOTE: IMF = International Monetary Fund,
a. Mostly loans from the Export-Import Bank.
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This discussion of the role of foreign assistance in South Korea's
development focuses primarily on U.S. assistance. The United States gave almost
as much economic assistance to Korea as all other donors combined. Between 1953
and 1963, when the foundation of Korea's future growth was being laid, the United
States provided almost all of that country's foreign assistance.
South Korea has tended to neglect investment in social services, including health
care. Both the South Korean government and U.S. aid agencies placed a relatively
low priority on investment in health. Between 1954 and 1964, the United States
spent about 3 percent of its project assistance on the health sector. Sanitation and
water supply projects usually received the highest priorities. Although Korea's
government spending on health has been low by Asian standards, private spending
on health services between 1960 and 1974 rose from 2.3 percent of private
consumption expenditures to 3.6 percent, reflecting in part rising incomes.29
Nevertheless, health conditions in Korea have improved considerably since
the 1950s. The number of hospitals and clinics nearly doubled between 1955 and
1975. In 1955, there were 6,141 doctors in Korea; that figure rose to 16,800 in 1975.
Infant mortality, a commonly used measure of access to health care, declined from
78 per thousand live births in 1955 to 49 in 1973. Finally, the death rate (deaths per
thousand people) declined from 14 in 1955 to 9 in 1973. According to a 1981 study,
despite those dramatic improvements, relatively low government involvement and
spending on health care left rural areas "underserved."30
Education
Education played one of the most important roles in Korea's economic growth and
development. Despite a strong cultural tradition that favored education, only 13.5
percent of the population was literate in 1945. But the government invested in
building schools and compelled six years of primary education. To help Korea meet
the demand for classrooms, which far exceeded the available supply, U.S. assistance
helped build 23,000 classrooms between 1952 and 1966.31 The United States spent
about 4 percent of its project assistance on education.
29. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 405.
30. Ibid., p. 407.
31. Krueger and Ruttan, "Assistance to Korea," p. 246.
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By the 1970s, the illiteracy rate had declined dramatically. Primary schools
were within walking distance for most village children. Middle schools, high
schools, and colleges, however, were still located only in urban centers.
Investment in infrastructure and institutions of higher education was
generated primarily by the private sector, although the Agency for International
Development helped develop the College of Agriculture of Seoul National
University. In the 1950s and 1960s, AID sent nearly 3,000 Koreans to the United
States for training.
Overall, the role of foreign assistance in promoting educational achievement
in Korea does not appear to have been a large one—not because foreign programs
were ineffective or badly managed, but because the Korean government and
especially Korean society placed considerable emphasis on education. The
government invested large sums in schools and infrastructure, but the private
sector—business and individual families—did more to support higher education.32
Population Growth
The major foreign aid organizations in this sector were the Agency for International
Development and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. Some
international nongovernmental organizations, such as Planned Parenthood, were also
involved.
During the 1950s, family planning and population programs were a low
priority of the Korean government. President Rhee opposed them and, hence,
devoted few resources to them. That view changed after President Park assumed
power. He instituted a national family planning program. The donors played an
important role in planning that program as well as providing funding and technical
assistance. The role of foreign organizations and donors in population programs later
declined, but they remained as providers of contraceptive supplies and as a source of
research and advanced training in family planning and population.
Various indicators revealed a dramatic decline in Korea's population growth
rate. Between 1960 and 1975, Korea's total fertility rate dropped from 6 births per
woman to under 4. One scholar has described that as "one of the fastest [fertility
declines] recorded in any nation in history."33
32. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, pp. 358-359.
33. Robert Repetto quoted in Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 381.
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It is difficult to say, of course, whether the slowing of Korea's population
growth and the steady decline in the fertility rate would have occurred in the absence
of President Park's national family planning program or foreign assistance. Some
scholars argue that part of the decline in growth and fertility rates might have
accompanied Korea's economic and social development regardless of official policy
or programs.34
Agriculture
Foreign assistance played a substantial role in promoting agriculture in South Korea.
Arguably, some of the U.S. foreign aid in the 1950s, notably P.L.480 food assistance
grants, enabled the Rhee government to neglect agricultural production because it
received a steady, cheap supply of foodstuffs from abroad. Nevertheless, foreign
assistance programs played a large and positive role in promoting land reform and
development, the use of fertilizer, and agricultural extension and research.
In the early 1960s, U.S. food aid was used to pay Korean laborers to create
additional farmland from hillsides and tideland areas; those laborers then assumed
ownership of the land. That program attempted to increased the available agri-
cultural land by 15 percent. It was discontinued after 1967 because of questions
about its management and cost-effectiveness. Some instances of corruption and
mismanagement also occurred. Finally, AID, the Asian Development Bank, the
World Bank, and the United Nations supported a massive irrigation effort between
the early 1960s and the late 1970s. The results were positive, despite some cost
overruns. Irrigated land increased from 662,000 hectares to 1,122,000.35
Between 1945 and the mid-1960s, U.S. assistance provided the primary
funding for importing agricultural input such as pesticides, fertilizers, and new seed
varieties. U.S. loans provided the means to build five fertilizer plants in Korea in the
1960s. When Korea became a net exporter of fertilizer as a result of those plants, the
United States terminated its assistance in that area.
Agricultural output grew at an annual rate of 3.2 percent between 1946 and
1973. According to one study, "about 57 percent of total production growth is
attributable to the increase of input and the remaining 42 percent to improvement in
34. See Robert Repetto and others, Economic Development, Population Policy, and Demographic
Transition in the Republic of Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 247-250.
35. Krueger and Ruttan, "Assistance to Korea," pp. 239-240.
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productivity."36 However, some problems occurred in the government's distribution
of aid-financed fertilizer that caused inefficiencies and black-market activity. U.S.
suggestions to privatize and improve distribution had little effect. Reforms in the late
1970s, long after U.S. assistance had ended in that area, solved those problems.37
U.S. assistance in the agricultural sector supported agricultural research and
extension services. Initially, much of the money AID provided was diverted for
other purposes. Agricultural research and extension had acquired a bad name
because it had been associated with Japanese colonialism. In 1962, those efforts
were reorganized. AID provided political and financial support to a newly created
independent agricultural agency attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
Its main efforts were devoted to agricultural research and the extension or transfer of
technology to farmers. The Korean government was committed to that program, and
the service became highly centralized, thus permitting the quick diffusion of new and
innovative technology that raised agricultural yields. Yet sometimes the very
effectiveness of the organization caused inappropriate technology to be diffused
equally well.
Overall, during the 1973-1980 period, after the research and extension service
was in place and foreign assistance in that sector was largely phased out, total
agricultural output grew 5.4 percent a year. Productivity—output per unit of total
input—grew 3.3 percent a year.38
Economic Growth
During the 1950s, U.S. economic assistance represented 69 percent of imports and
77 percent of all saving in South Korea. Food aid was particularly important in
sustaining the Rhee government. One study estimated that without all that
assistance, Korea's living standards would have been 10 percent to 15 percent
lower.39
Nevertheless, the inward-looking, import-substitution policies of the Rhee
government were constricting the economy, regardless of the size of aid flows. U.S.
officials fully recognized that fact and tried to persuade the Korean government to
36. Sung Hwan Ban, Pal Yong Moon, and Dwight H. Perkins, Rural Development (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1980), pp. 57-60.
37. Krueger and Ruttan, "Assistance to Korea," p. 242.
38. Ibid., pp. 243-244.
39. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 459.
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make reforms. Although Rhee made a few concessions along those lines, such as a
devaluation of the currency and an attempt at greater fiscal discipline, "the overall
strategy of the Rhee government was to maximize the gap between domestic
resources and expenditures for foreign aid to fill. Because the United States was
politically committed to the maintenance of the South Korean government, U.S.
bargaining power was relatively weak."40
In fact, Rhee's aid strategy included a measure of deception. For example,
the Rhee government counseled its ministries to understate Korea's harvests "to try
to maximize the inputs of United States agricultural products under the aid program
.. ."
41
 He apparently succeeded in that effort. In some years during the 1950s, the
United States provided a third or more of the total budget for the government. In
1956, U.S. support for the Korean government's budget reached 58 percent of total
expenditures.42 One study has called that a policy of "coercive deficiency."43
Arguably, aid's most significant contribution to Korea's future economic
growth was in providing infrastructure investment and technical assistance. U.S.
assistance also helped Korea to recover from the war and rebuild as quickly as it did.
The large amount of infrastructure construction—power systems, railroads, and port
capacity—that the United States financed probably permitted faster economic growth
in future years than otherwise would have been possible. In addition, Krueger and
Ruttan have argued that "the experience gained in infrastructure construction in the
1950s and 1960s enabled Korea to become a major exporter of construction services
to the Middle East in the 1970s and early 1980s."44
Many lower-level officials within the Rhee government received training in
economics in the United States. They argued for economic reforms in the 1950s but
were resisted at the upper echelons of the government. In the 1960s under the
reform-minded Park government, however, their skills and expertise were put to
good use in designing and implementing the outward-looking, export-oriented
economic strategy that launched Korea on the path of rapid economic growth.
According to one analyst, "one may sum up the pre-Park era on overall aid
effectiveness as one in which foreign assistance was essential to the survival of the
state but poorly used and unimaginatively planned and administered. Some
40. Krueger and Ruttan, "Assistance to Korea," p. 234.
41. Cole and Lyman, Korean Development, p. 79.
42. Steinberg, Foreign Aid and the Development of Korea, p. 23.
43. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 458.
44. Krueger and Ruttan, "Assistance to Korea," p. 235.
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preconditions for growth were created: excess industrial capacity, an educated
population, and foreign, modern specialized training in skills needed for
development. The results, however, did not seem equal to the effort."45
In the late 1950s, U.S. officials began to place more emphasis on
development. They warned the Rhee government that aid flows would gradually
decline and eventually end. That warning, and the realization on the part of many
Koreans that the United States actually meant it, stimulated efforts to put Korea's
economic house in order. General Park justified his military coup in 1961 in part
because the Rhee government had "frittered away" large quantities of foreign
assistance.46 The Park government began to reform economic policies in the early
1960s. Those reforms were crucial factors in Korea's successful development.
According to an AID study, by 1964 that agency was playing an extremely
important role in planning, supporting, and sometimes even directing South Korea's
export strategy—the key to its industrialization. AID personnel and advisers
provided most of the expertise necessary to create the institutions, laws, and
procedures to promote South Korean exports. AID personnel staffed the South
Korean government entities that were making policy for the export drive, identified
and encouraged foreign buyers of Korean exports, provided technical advice on
improving Korean export products, funded trips by Korean business representatives
to examine methods of promoting exports, and provided technical advice on almost
every conceivable aspect of reorienting the South Korean economy toward exports.
President Park provided the political will to reform and export, and AID provided the
technical expertise for the first few years.47
The foreign aid South Korea received in the late 1960s and 1970s was
important to its development in other ways. Primarily, that aid increased the pool of
available investment capital. The period between 1965 and 1975 illustrates what a
developing country can accomplish when it adopts sound economic policies, has
favorable background conditions such as a well-educated labor force, and has extra
capital provided by international sources and uses it for investment. Foreign
transfers declined as a share of total domestic investment over that period, from an
average of 75 percent in the 1960-1962 period to 5.1 percent in the 1973-1974 period
45. Steinberg, Foreign Aid and the Development of Korea, p. 27.
46. Cole and Lyman, Korean Development, p. 78.
47. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research,
USAID and Economic Policy Reform: Origins and Case Studies (Forthcoming).
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(see Table 4). By the 1970s, South Korea was sufficiently creditworthy to borrow
the capital it needed on the international market.48
Could South Korea have developed just as quickly if it had not received such
high levels of foreign assistance in the 1960s and 1970s? Some critics of foreign aid
argue that South Korea began to make reforms only after the United States threatened
to stop providing aid and that South Korea's growth trajectory soared only after U.S.
aid ended. That argument, however, is somewhat misleading. On the one hand, the
Rhee government was finally motivated to make some reforms when the United
States informed it that aid flows would decline in the future. On the other hand, it
is not clear that the Park government, which made the most important reforms, was
motivated by the impending end of aid resources. Park wanted to reform the
economy to make it grow in order to gain legitimacy for his government. Moreover,
he did so with AID's help, particularly in promoting exports. Finally, South Korea
continued to receive aid from multilateral institutions, war reparations from Japan,
and credits from the Export-Import Bank.
The positive economic policies Korea adopted in the early 1960s and its
strong base of human capital probably would have fostered significant economic
growth in the succeeding 10 years regardless of the amount of foreign assistance it
received. But growth would probably have been slower simply because the
investment pool would have been smaller or, if Korea could have obtained the funds
from the international capital markets, more government revenues would have been
needed for servicing the debt.49
Military Assistance
U.S. military assistance to Korea between 1953 and 1960—approximately $8.7
billion in 1997 dollars—aided Korea's development in several different ways. First,
U.S. assistance helped build up the strong military establishment that South Korea
needed to ensure its defense after the Korean War. By providing support for the
defense budget, the United States allowed South Korea to devote resources to other,
more productive sectors.
Second, thousands of Korean military officers were trained in the United
States. After they left military service, many of them assumed important roles in the
civilian government and economy. According to an AID study, much of the early
supply of skilled labor in the 1960s and 1970s, such as electricians and mechanics,
came from the military.
48. Mason and others, Economic and Social Modernization of Korea, p. 459.
49. Ibid., p. 187.
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TABLE 4. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SAVING IN SOUTH KOREA, 1958-1974
(Saving as a percentage of total investment)
Total Investment Domestic Saving Foreign Savinga
as a Percentage of GNP Private Government Transfers Borrowing
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
12.9
10.7
10.9
13.1
13.0
18.4
14.5
14.7
21.6
21.9
26.7
29.8
27.2
25.6
20.9
26.2
31.4
62.5
61.5
33.2
42.8
22.1
39.0
44.8
38.1
41.6
35.5
27.5
38.0
34.5
33.3
53.1
66.9
51.7
-24.1
-25.0
-18.7
-13.6
-10.7
-1.4
3.5
11.5
13.0
18.5
23.5
20.8
25.5
23.6
18.6
17.4
9.6
69.8
67.0
82.3
69.5
72.9
37.8
43.5
44.2
26.5
21.7
14.6
11.4
8.0
7.4
8.3
5.9
4.3
-8.2
-3.5
-4.0
-4.3
10.0
20.6
5.1
-2.0
12.5
18.5
28.5
25.5
27.4
36.6
18.4
9.5
38.9
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Korean Economic Planning Board.
NOTES: Domestic saving and foreign saving should total 100 percent However, various statistical discrepancies may put
such a total off by a few percent.
GNP = gross national product.
a. Foreign transfers and perhaps a small proportion of foreign borrowing represent foreign aid. Most foreign borrowing
is private capital. Negative numbers indicate that loan repayments exceeded additional borrowing.
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Indeed, a fair amount of the social mobility in Korean society during the 1960s and
1970s resulted from service in the military.
Third, Korea's development experience was largely a hierarchical and
centralized process. The experience gained by many people in the command
structure of the Korean military may have contributed to the success of many Korean
development projects. Both President Park and President Chung were former army
generals who pursued Korea's development from the top down. But no definitive
analysis has been written—or perhaps can be written—about that contribution.
INFLUENCE OF GOVERNANCE ON THE PHILIPPINES' DEVELOPMENT
Development in the Philippines has lagged behind that of many other nations of East
Asia. The poor development record reflects a climate of economic mismanagement
and massive corruption, in addition to the waste of large amounts of foreign aid. The
policies of Ferdinand Marcos, who ruled the Philippines from 1966 to 1986, deserve
much of the blame for that state of affairs. During his tenure, the Philippines
dropped from being one of the most prosperous nations in Asia to being one of the
poorest. Although the Philippine economy grew during the Marcos presidency,
poverty increased, natural resources were depleted, and foreign debt ballooned.
Since Marcos left, the economy has improved, but the Philippines' prospects remain
uncertain.
The Structure of Government
The Philippine democracy in the 1950s and 1960s was patterned after that of the
United States, with a president, a congress, and an independent judiciary. In reality,
the presidency in the Philippines was much stronger than its U.S. counterpart.
Philippine politics were dominated by an oligarchy until 1972. A small number of
wealthy, landed families controlled the congress and usually rotated the presidency
among different regional power centers. As some scholars have observed, "the
extended family was a particularly strong source of identification and status in the
Philippines, and patron-client relationships linked the population to the oligarchic
family in its area or region."50 Members of that oligarchy, though by no means
unanimous in their outlook, set the nation's economic and political policy. Ferdinand
Marcos was only the second president since 1946 who was not considered a member
50. Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt
in the Philippines," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins, Developing Country Debt and Economic
Performance, vol. 3, Country Studies—Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 376.
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of that ruling group. And the congress often served as the oligarchy's arena of elite
representation and bargaining.
Ferdinand Marcos was elected president in 1966 and, breaking tradition, was
reelected in 1969. In 1972, in the wake of domestic disorder, he staged a coup
whereby he dissolved the legislature, shut down the media, and arrested hundreds of
individuals in the name of restoring domestic political order. He ruled by decree and
wrote a new constitution—actions that have been called "constitutional authori-
tarianism."51 He ruled until driven from power by a "people's power" revolution in
1986.
Around the time of Marcos's coup, a Muslim-led insurgency broke out in the
southern part of the country. The Philippines is overwhelmingly Christian, and the
Muslim forces sought greater autonomy. Although that conflict was a seemingly
intractable problem that took more than 20 years to end, it was confined and did not
impinge much on the normal business of most of the country. Marcos also had to
deal with the Marxist-oriented New People's Army in the northern part of the
country.
Philippine politics under Marcos's successors—Corazon Aquino and Fidel
Ramos—appear to resemble those of the pre-Marcos era. The oligarchy still
dominates the political system, and the president is the strongest political force in the
country. In addition, Aquino's first few years were characterized by numerous
attempted coups and the communist insurgency. Those threats largely receded as her
term ended, and she was succeeded by Fidel Ramos, a former army chief of staff and
defense minister.
Corruption
A major impediment to development in the Philippines has been widespread
government corruption, especially under Marcos. In the 1950s and 1960s, the
Filipino political system was used to enrich members of the ruling elite. State-owned
enterprises were generally badly run and corrupt, and side-payments and kickbacks
to politicians were common. A major reason for running and holding office was to
enjoy those "benefits." As one member of the Philippine senate put it: "What are
we in power for? We are not hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when
51. Ibid., p. 386.
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in reality we are not?"52 Indeed, access to credit at below-market rates was one of the
privileges of government in the Philippines.
Under Marcos, however, the use of the political and economic system to
benefit the president and his friends expanded on a massive scale. Robert Dohner
and Ponciano Intal have characterized the behavior of that group as "crony
capitalism" and attribute to it a major portion of the blame for the Philippines'
underdevelopment. Crony capitalism was conducted through various means, such
as awarding government contracts to the politically favored, padding expenses, and
providing kickbacks. But "the most important aspect was the creation of
monopolies, either through direct intervention to control an industry or through
granting exemptions or exclusive privileges to favored individuals."53 For example,
in the forestry sector, some of the logging licenses went to government ministers and
Marcos's friends. Even when land was allocated to others, Marcos's allies were
allowed to log in those areas under the pretext of clearing the forest for settlement
projects of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.54 According to one study, the cost to
the Philippine economy of crony capitalism in the early 1980s represented at least 10
percent of government revenues, not counting all the investment it may have
discouraged and capital flight it encouraged.55
Moreover, Yoshihara Kunio, in a comparative study of the Philippines and
Thailand, has argued that corruption has extended to the Philippine police forces and
judiciary. Many police have worked for criminal syndicates. High-ranking police
officials receive a modest salary yet live luxuriously. The Philippine police,
Yoshihara concluded, are "probably the most corrupt government agency in the
Philippines."56 Some judges were allegedly influenced by money during trials; even
before martial law, the rich and powerful in the Philippines could evade punishment
for many crimes, including murder.57
As martial law corrupted law enforcement and the economy deteriorated, the
crime rate exploded. That contributed to the flight of domestic capital from the
52. Quoted in James K. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment
in the Marcos Era (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), p. 8.
53. Dohner and Intal, "The Marcos Legacy," p. 399.
54. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment, pp. 233-234.
55. Dohner and Intal, "The Marcos Legacy," pp. 478-479.
56. Yoshihara Kunio, The Nation and Economic Growth: The Philippines and Thailand (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 193.
57. Ibid., p. 194.
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Philippines during the 1970s and 1980s. Private property of the poorer classes was
often confiscated by wealthy individuals, and the poor could do little about it except
join the rebels. Owners of small businesses would lose their businesses to criminals
who used fake titles or legal gimmicks to claim property they did not own, and the
judges would uphold their tactics.
Absence of Land Reform
Unlike South Korea, the Philippines has not implemented a major land reform
program. Reform of land tenureship and ownership patterns, which many scholars
say is necessary for improving rural life and alleviating poverty, has been extremely
limited. As a remnant of the Spanish colonial era, some small peasant landholders
coexist in the Philippines alongside large plantations that produce crops for export.
Poverty in rural areas in the Philippines is severe and deepened during the Marcos
era.
The powerful land-owning oligarchy, especially the sugar barons, have
controlled the congress and resisted any attempt at land reform. In the 1950s,
President Magasaysay managed to pass some very weak legislation, which had little
substantive impact on ownership patterns. Marcos was frustrated by the congress in
some land reform efforts during his elected administrations. Under martial law, he
made some reforms that benefited the tenants and owners but bypassed the large pool
of landless agricultural workers. Export agriculture has remained largely untouched
by land reform efforts. Even President Aquino, a member of the oligarchy and
daughter of a sugar plantation owner, declared that she opposed land reform of the
sugar plantations because it would not be economically feasible. Erik Thorbecke
suggests, however, that this view is mistaken. Production of crops such as sugar are
likely to face constant or decreasing returns to scale—that is, as the farming
enterprise becomes larger, the costs of production remain constant or increase. Only
in processing activities are there increasing returns to scale.58
INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICIES ON THE PHILIPPINES'
DEVELOPMENT
Economic nationalism is a theme that has existed in Philippine politics and economic
policymaking. There exists a strong desire to "Filipinize" the country's economy—
that is, to reserve land ownership, use of natural resources, and participation in many
58. Erik Thorbecke, "The Political Economy of Development: Indonesia and the Philippines" (Inaugural
Frank H. Golay Memorial Lecture, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., November 11, 1994), p. 25.
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economic activities for native Filipinos. That sentiment has included discouraging
foreign investors and the Philippines' industrious and entrepreneurial Chinese
minority throughout the post-World War II period.
Economic and trade policy in the 1950s was dominated by a straggle between
the sugar barons and the owners of industry. The sugar barons favored "more liberal
trade and exchange rate policies—avoiding overvaluation of the peso and limiting
the degree of import protection."59 Increasingly, however, they were challenged by
the inward-looking, import-substituting industrial sector. By the end of the 1950s,
that sector had emerged as a more powerful force, advocating and benefiting from
protection and overvaluation of the currency.
Four factors seemed to account for the Philippines' economic growth in the
1950s. First and most important was the "accelerated social change in attitudes and
values which determined the 'will to economize'—the intensity of economic
activity."60 Perhaps the critical source of that change was the public school system.
Based on the U.S. model, it instilled in Filipinos the notion that individual dignity,
security, and welfare depended as much on their own abilities as on birth or the
vagaries of nature.
Second, the Philippines maintained a consistent economic policy of relying
on private initiative and capitalism. Although a few state-run enterprises existed,
Filipinos generally believed that growth came from private initiative and that
socialism was not a path to the future. That is not to say that the government pursued
a completely free-market approach; it used consumer price controls and invested in
public enterprises that were not very profitable, but the government—primarily the
congress—has been generally conservative in expanding the economic role of the
state. The Filipinization of the economy through subsidized credit, domestic
protection, and tax exemptions accelerated the growth of Filipino entrepreneurship
and contributed to the accumulation of capital.
Third, foreign saving, primarily from the United States, covered the
Philippines' current-account deficits and contributed the bulk of net investment in the
1950s. Finally, the government stimulated the domestic market through effective
controls on the exchange rate and imports, creating a highly protectionist
environment in which young businesses could grow.61
59. Dohner and Intal, "The Marcos Legacy," p. 376.
60. Frank H. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 408.
61. Ibid., pp. 411-414.
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The Marcos Presidency and Martial Law
Marcos immediately sought to accelerate growth through expansionary fiscal and
monetary policies. The government greatly raised capital expenditures, especially
on infrastructure—irrigation, roads, schools, and communications—in rural areas.
Between 1964 and 1968, government expenditures rose by 43 percent in real terms
from 11.5 percent to 14 percent as a percentage of GNP. Domestic credit was
relaxed by the central bank; according to one study, credit increased by 40 percent
between 1965 and 1967—more than twice the rise of nominal GNP.62 GNP also
grew, but the price of that growth was balance-of-payments and debt-service
problems. As a percentage of GNP, external debt grew from 13 percent in the 1965-
1968 period to 33 percent in 1970. Marcos himself stated that servicing the
Philippines' debt in 1970 would "take over half our export earnings."63 The
International Monetary Fund and other credit institutions persuaded the Philippine
government to implement a stabilization program that included cutting government
expenditures and devaluing the peso. By the end of 1970, the peso's value had
dropped by 43 percent relative to the dollar.
The early 1970s was a period of stabilization. External debt fell as a
percentage of GNP, which was growing at a brisk pace (see Table 5). The current
account went from deficit to surplus. But real wages declined between 1969 and
1973, despite a rising per capita GNP. The lower wages and the low value of the
peso fueled the Philippines' exports, but that did not "translate into improvements
in the lot of Filipino masses."64
Shortly after declaring martial law in 1972, Marcos sharply expanded the role
of government in development. He formed the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) to plan it. The state took ownership of the Philippine Airlines,
multinational oil companies sold their stakes to the state-owned Philippine National
Oil Company, and the military acquired several private steel mills to form the
National Steel Corporation.65 Technocrats armed with economics, business, and
engineering degrees increasingly staffed the bureaucracy.
62. Dohner and Intal, "The Marcos Legacy," p. 383.
63. Quoted in Dohner and Intal, "The Marcos Legacy," p. 382.
64. Ibid., pp. 383-384.
65. Bela Balassa, Economic Policies in the Pacific Area Developing Countries (New York: New York
University Press, 1991), p. 166.
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TABLE 5. ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE PHILIPPINES, 1965-1973
(As a percentage of gross national product)
Indicator 1965-1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Real GNP (Percentage growth) 4.9a 5.2 3.9 6.5 5.4 9.3
Budget Surplus -0.7 -3.5 0.2 -0.5 -2.4 -1.2
External Debt 13 22 33 27 26 22
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., 'The Marcos
Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins,
Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, vol. 3, Country Studies—Indonesia, Korea,
Philippines, Turkey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 384.
NOTE: GNP = gross national product,
a. Annual average.
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Government expenditures rose after martial law was established in 1972 (see
Table 6). By increasing the level of foreign borrowing, Marcos dramatically raised
public investment. By 1978, it had risen to 7 percent of GNP, or 30 percent of total
domestic capital formation.
For a few years Marcos's program seemed to work. GNP per capita grew at
a vigorous average annual rate of 3.0 percent between 1973 and 1979. In addition,
international prices for many of the Philippines' primary exports, such as copper and
wood, rose dramatically. That growth, and massive increases in government
spending, enabled the economy to weather the first oil crisis in 1973-1974.
The Philippine export base diversified during the 1970s. In 1970, over 90
percent of exports were primary or slightly processed commodities. By 1979, that
proportion had fallen to 50 percent. In their place were labor-intensive,
nontraditional manufactured exports. The manufacture of some goods for export
contained a large amount of imported materials and thus required substantial foreign
exchange to pay for them. But the government managed that debt carefully, and debt
service did not increase very much as a percentage of export earnings. As a
percentage of GNP, the Philippines' external debt was comparable with Korea's.
The average Filipino, however, did not participate in those economic gains.
Real wage rates for agricultural workers declined by 25 percent between 1966 and
1986 (see Table 7). Urban workers, both skilled and unskilled, fared even worse:
their real wages declined by 69 percent and 73 percent during the same period. Thus,
although the economic pie was growing larger, the distribution of that pie appeared
to be shifting against the poorest segments of the population. Between 1971 and
1985, the percentage of the population living in poverty increased dramatically, as
shown below:66
Percentage
of Population
Year in Poverty
1965 41.0
1971 43.8
1975 51.5
1985 58.9
66. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment, p. 46. Data on
poverty should be treated with caution. Researchers have been unable to explain how poverty could
increase and wages decline while per capita GNP increased during the 1970s. Moreover, poverty is
not a clearly defined concept. In the Philippines, poverty lines have been based on estimates of the
income needed to meet nutritional requirements. However, if the income of poor families has been
understated over time, it could dramatically affect estimates of poverty trends. Furthermore, defining
poverty in that manner gives no indication of how far below the poverty line people are.
32

TABLE 6. ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE PHILIPPINES, 1973-1979
(As a percentage of gross national product)
Indicator
Real GNP (Percentage growth)
Government Expenditure
Budget Surplus
Investment
Saving
1973
9
14
-1
.3
.3
.2
21.9
27.0
1974
5,
11.
0.
26.
25,
,6
.7
.5
.7
.4
1975
5.8
16.0
-1.6
30.6
25.3
1976
7.4
15.2
-1.8
31.3
25.4
1977
6
14
-1
29
25
.3
.9
.9
.0
.8
1978
5
14
-1
29
24
.8
.8
.2
.1
.4
1979
6.9
13.7
-0.2
31.0
26.6
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos
Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins,
Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, vol. 3, Country Studies—Indonesia, Korea,
Philippines, Turkey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 389,391.
NOTE: GNP = gross national product.
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TABLE 7. STANDARD-OF-LIVING INDICATORS FOR THE PHILIPPINES, 1962-1986
Indicator 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986
Wage Rate*
Agricultural worker
Skilled urban worker
Unskilled urban worker
Unemployment Rate
Prices"
Food
Nonfood
100
100
100
21.8°
20.4
27.8
93.6
89.1
96.1
22.0
27.6
29.6
75.9
89.5
103.3
14.9d
33.4
36.1
54.2
55.3
63.0
10.6
74.5
70.1
87.6
54.0
57.2
14.7
100
100
65.0
48.8k
41.1b
24.1
162.5
186.3
70.7
27.8
25.7
22.9
329.1
387.3
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from James K. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy
of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993).
a. Real daily wage rate index: 1962 = 100.
b. Value shown is for 1983; value for 1982 is not available.
c. Value shown is for 1961; value for 1962 is not available.
d. Value shown is for 1971; value for 1970 is not available.
e. Real food price index: 1978 = 100.
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The Economic Crisis of the 1980s
The economic situation in the Philippines deteriorated rapidly after the second oil
shock in 1979-1980. Between 1980 and 1986, total GNP declined and per capita
GNP fell by an average of 3.3 percent a year. Export earnings also dropped 5 percent
a year from 1980 to 1983. The government tried to alleviate those conditions by
increasing its expenditures and foreign borrowing. The external debt grew from 52
percent of GNP in 1980 to 93 percent in 1985. But foreign and domestic investors
lacked the confidence that the economic problems were short term. Net foreign
investment declined to almost nothing, and capital flight may have reached 5 percent
of GNP in 1981 and 1982.67
In an effort to stem the decline, the government made a severe adjustment.
Investment as a share of GNP declined by more than 50 percent between 1980 and
1985 (see Table 8). Government expenditures were cut to control inflation, which
exceeded 50 percent in 1984. By the time Marcos left office in 1986, external debt
was nearly equal to GNP. Income levels were no higher than they had been in 1974.
Four factors contributed to this state of affairs. First, the high level of public-
sector investment did not translate into higher rates of economic growth. Second, the
Philippines financed that investment through foreign borrowing. The government
continued to borrow, it was unable to raise resources domestically, and export
earnings were not growing fast enough to service the debt. The government
maintained overvalued exchange rates and protectionist trade policies, which had a
particularly negative impact on the agriculture sector, the source of much of the
Philippines' foreign exchange. Imports of food products were cheap relative to
domestic production, which tended to reduce farmers' income and production. Third,
the absence of land reform contributed to the high incidence of poverty in rural areas.
Last and perhaps most important was corruption in the Marcos government.
The government borrowed abroad to invest domestically. At every step in that
process, there were bribes and kickbacks and other forms of self-aggrandizement by
Marcos, his family, and his friends. According to Erik Thorbecke, the very purpose
of the borrowing and the investment in many cases was to divert resources in the
planning and construction phases.68 The government was often obligated to pay back
the loan even though it generated little return to the country. As one scholar put it,
"to a real extent, the Philippines under martial law developed a [self-serving]. . .
67. Dohner and Intal, "The Marcos Legacy," p. 393.
68. Thorbecke, "The Political Economy of Development," p. 29.
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TABLE 8. ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR THE PHILIPPINES, 1980-1988
Indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Real GNP (Percentage growth) 5.0 3.4 1.9 1.1 -7.1 -4.1 2.0 5.9 6.7
External Debt (Percentage of GNP) 49.0 n.a. 62.8 72.7 80.6 81.7 92.9 84.1 n.a.
Investment (Percentage of GNP) 30.7 30.7 28.8 27.5 19.2 14.3 13.2 15.4 18.2
Debt Service3 20.8 n.a. 38.1 38.2 43.4 36.9 34.0 35.3 n.a.
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal, Jr., "The Marcos
Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins,
Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, vol. 3, Country Studies—Indonesia, Korea,
Philippines, Turkey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989): pp. 392, 394.
NOTE: GNP = gross national product; n.a. = not available.
a. Total interest payments plus amortization of total medium- and long-term debt as a percentage of exports of goods and
services.
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government which over time would sap the energy of the domestic economy and
which contributed significantly to the economic crisis of the 1980s."69
Economic Policy Under Aquino and Ramos
Economic policy under Corazon Aquino, who assumed the presidency in 1986, did
not immediately resolve the Philippines' problems, but it made progress. Economic
growth improved in the first few years after the fall of Marcos, largely as a result of
a stabilization and adjustment program that the International Monetary Fund had
imposed during the last few years of the Marcos government. GNP grew 4 percent
a year between 1986 and 1992. Between 1987 and 1992, GNP per capita grew at an
average annual rate of 1.9 percent. Some major changes included establishing a
neutral export regime, reforming the tax and financial system, and curbing
government intervention in the economy. However, not all problems were solved.
For example, the depletion of natural resources continued, especially in the
watersheds and fisheries, and poverty remained high.
In 1992, Fidel Ramos was elected to the presidency. He intended to carry out
a comprehensive economic reform program. Ramos largely succeeded in reducing
tariff barriers, privatizing state-owned industries, reducing external debt, cutting
government expenditures, increasing private investment in infrastructure, increasing
GNP, and reducing the poverty rate.
The Philippines seems on track to greater sustained growth. Many analysts
believe that it has broken the cycle from its past. Yet there is some concern that this
progress is dependent on Ramos, whose term expires in 1998 and who cannot run for
reelection. And "crony capitalism," in the words of AID, "is not yet dead."70
ROLE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES' DEVELOPMENT
The Philippines has received foreign assistance from a variety of sources during the
past 40 years (see Figure 3). U.S. economic and military assistance accounted for
two-thirds of the aid to the Philippines in the 1950s and 1960s. The World Bank
69. Dohner and Intal, "The Marcos Legacy," p. 389.
70. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation: Fiscal Year 1996 (February 24,
1995), p. 332.
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FIGURE 3. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES, 1953-1993
BiDions of 1997 Dollars
4 -
2 -
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1993
U.S. Economic Aidgg U.S. Military Aid jm Other U.S. Aic
Multilateral Aid ^ Other Bilateral Aid^ Use of IMF Credit
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Agency for International Development, the World Bank,
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
NOTE: IMF = International Monetary Fund,
a. Mostly loans from the Export-Import Bank.
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began lending to the Philippines in 1958 and eventually became a primary provider
of foreign assistance to the Marcos government. The Asian Development Bank
began lending to the Philippines in 1969. Other countries, particularly Japan, have
also given assistance.
U.S. assistance was motivated partly by strategic considerations. The United
States did not want to see the Philippines succumb to a communist-backed
insurgency. Since a communist government was avoided, U.S. aid in one sense
succeeded. But the aid may also have undermined the development goals of U.S.
assistance.
Health
The role of foreign aid in the health sector is difficult to evaluate, but health
indicators did improve. Between 1961 and 1993, the United States, the World Bank,
and the Asian Development Bank allocated about 7 percent of their economic
assistance to health. Infant mortality rates fell from 72 deaths per thousand in 1967
to 44 in 1992. The United States appeared to put particular emphasis on reducing
infant mortality through various child survival programs.71 Other measures also
indicate improvement. For example, crude death rates—deaths per thousand—have
declined, and life expectancy has increased.
Education
The population of the Philippines, like that of South Korea, has been well educated
for some time. The literacy rate in 1970 already exceeded 80 percent. In 1992, the
rate was 90 percent. Between 1961 and 1993, AID, the World Bank, and the Asian
Development Bank allocated about 4 percent of their economic assistance to
education. An AID evaluation describes the building of schools as one of its most
"consistently successful" programs. Between 1980 and 1991, U.S. money helped
build more than 2,300 school buildings—improving the standard of living and
educational levels in the communities they serve. A school building is often the most
well constructed building in a rural community and serves as protection for an entire
town during severe storms, such as typhoons.72
71. Benjamin P. Loevinsohn, Setting Quantitative Objectives in Health Sector Programs: Lessons Learned
from the Philippine Child Survival Program, CSP Monograph No. 3 (Manila: Department of Health,
Republic of the Philippines, 1993).
72. Agency for International Development, "AID Evaluation in Summary, Part 1," in AID Impact
Evaluation: Economic Support Fund Infrastructure Program, 1980 to 1991 (May 1991), p. 1.
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Population Growth
In 1967, the Agency for International Development began providing assistance to the
Philippines to deal with issues related to population. AID trained and supported
personnel who staffed various clinics and other organizations. It also supported
various methods of contraception. During the Marcos era, AID's population
activities were highly integrated with those of the Philippine government. Those
efforts, however, encountered some hostility from the Aquino government. Overall,
major donors have not allocated a large percentage of their aid to population issues.
Between 1961 and 1993, the United States, the World Bank, and the Asian
Development Bank allocated approximately 1 percent of their economic assistance
to population programs.
The Philippines has seen a slowing of population growth and a falling fertility
rate. The prevalence of various methods of contraception, particularly voluntary
sterilization and the pill, have grown substantially—from 15 percent to 36 percent
between 1968 and 1988. Problems in those programs have included inadequate
training, weak field supervision of programs, and some poorly conceived incentive
programs. Although the fertility rate has declined, AID does not claim credit. In an
evaluation of its contraceptive program, the agency stated that "fertility has continued
to decrease at a rate that cannot be accounted for by the methods in which A.I.D. has
made its greatest investment."73
Agriculture
Judging the usefulness of the agricultural aid provided by AID, the World Bank, and
the Asian Development Bank is also difficult. Those organizations spent over 20
percent of their assistance on agriculture. Sectoral evaluations of efforts by the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are not available, but a 1987 AID
evaluation of its projects reported that its Bicol River Basin Development Program
provided substantial benefits to one of the poorest regions of the Philippines. AID
spent $29 million on that project—a small fraction of U.S. money spent in the
agriculture sector. Household income in the area grew, irrigation increased, and crop
yields rose substantially.74
73. Agency for International Development, Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
Evaluation of AID's Family Planning Program in the Philippines, AID Evaluation Highlights No. 11
(1992), p. 8.
74. Agency for International Development, Asia Near East Bureau, The Impact of U.S. Development
Assistance in Asia and the Near East (1987), pp. 127-128.
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The United States contributed relatively small amounts to agricultural
research. But when combined with resources from other donors and the government
of the Philippines, that aid yielded some impressive results. Those results included
a first-class agricultural university and research efforts that eliminated diseases and
increased agricultural yields, particularly for small farmers. The financial return of
those efforts, according to AID, far exceeded their costs.
The broader picture, however, appears less positive. Although rice yields and
those of agricultural products grown for export have risen since the 1960s, the
benefits have accrued largely to the wealthy segments of Philippine society and,
during the Marcos years, to Marcos and his allies in particular. Agricultural wage
rates declined under Marcos, and the rural poor suffered considerably. In the absence
of reform and improvements in many other areas—such as the overall policy
environment—most Filipinos who worked in agriculture were not better off.75
Economic Growth
Not much is known about the effectiveness of U.S. aid programs to the Philippines
during the 1950s and 1960s. U.S. money spent on building infrastructure produced
some positive results, but at that time AID did not require systematic evaluations of
the impact of its projects. Hence, CBO is unable to determine whether those projects
were maintained, for example, or whether they had a negative environmental
impact.76
Foreign aid provided to the Philippines under Marcos may have actually hurt
the country's development by reinforcing his economic mismanagement and
corruption. Between 1966 and 1986, the international community gave or lent
approximately $33 billion (in 1997 dollars) to the Philippines, most of which was
intended to promote economic growth. But per capita GNP averaged only 0.8
percent growth per year during that period. Moreover, poverty increased, and rural
and urban wages declined dramatically. The Philippines' external debt as a
percentage of GNP grew from 13 percent in the mid-1960s to 93 percent in 1986.
And calculations of capital leaving the Philippines between 1962 and 1986 totaled
over $19 billion, not including an adjustment for lost interest. Before being driven
75. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment, p. 155.
76. Chris Hermann, U.S. Assistance for Infrastructure Development from 1946 to 1995: Fifty Years of
Accomplishment (Agency for International Development, May 26, 1995), p. 10.
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from power, Marcos, his family, and close associates "recycled" a substantial amount
of the Philippines' external borrowing by sending or taking it out of the country.77
A long-term AID study on the building of infrastructure during the Marcos
years reported positive results, especially in rural areas. Although very little
information exists about the economic and social impact of infrastructure projects
between the early 1960s and 1973, AID asserts that "it is fair to conclude that the
construction of roads, bridges, irrigation systems and other small-scale projects
helped meet local infrastructure [needs]."78 During the period of martial law, AID
continued to support many infrastructure projects designed to expand development
in rural areas. Here, again, it is difficult to evaluate their impact on development.
On the one hand, some analysts claim that many of those projects must have
provided benefits to the populations and regions that they served, because the amount
of resources going into infrastructure development was far greater than in any other
sector. On the other hand, the actual record of per capita GNP growth under Marcos
is uninspiring. If foreign aid projects were improving the conditions of the poor, the
improvement did not show up in aggregate national indicators.
After Marcos was driven from power in 1986, the major foreign aid donors
joined together in a cooperative assistance program to the Aquino government—the
Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI). The MAI was an effort led by the United
States to rally the international community to help rebuild the Philippine economy
and support democracy. The reform program of Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos,
Aquino's successor, has received strong support from the MAI donors. The United
States, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank played critical roles in
helping amplify, fine-tune, and promote the reform agenda.
The MAI also funded various regional development activities, placing
particular emphasis on building infrastructure. Although determining the precise
responsibility of foreign aid is difficult, those efforts helped build an economy that
has flourished since the early 1990s. In 1995, Philippine Finance Secretary Roberto
de Ocampo credited the MAI with helping bring that about: "A large part of the
credit for our dramatic turnaround and persistent push towards a track of high growth
can be owed to strong international support—specifically to the Multilateral
Assistance Initiative."79
77. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment, pp. 279, 295, 297.
Some estimates put the amount in the billions of dollars.
78. Hermann, U.S. Assistance for Infrastructure Development from 1946 to 1995, p. 26.
79. Quoted in Agency for International Development, The Philippines: Results Review and Resource
Request (March 1996), p. 5.
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DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES
In comparing the development histories of South Korea and the Philippines, several
observations seem particularly important. First, military expenditures did not seem
to hinder development. Throughout the past 40 years, South Korea has devoted a
greater percentage of its GNP to the military than the Philippines.
Second, the economic policy environment was probably the most important
determinant of development. South Korea's inward-looking economic policies in the
1950s hindered its development, whereas the outward-looking policies of succeeding
decades spurred economic growth. Marcos pursued economic policies that were
similar to Rhee's in Korea during the 1950s, resulting in extremely slow growth, a
large external debt, and a fragile, underdeveloped economy.
Third, Korea's moderate levels of corruption under the Park regime did not
substantially undermine its growth prospects so long as it maintained an outward-
looking, export-oriented economic policy. The high levels of corruption under
Marcos, however, played an important role in undermining the Philippines'
development, exacerbating the damage done by inward-looking economic policies.
Fourth, foreign aid is less effective when it is given for political as well as
developmental reasons. Rhee knew that the United States was committed to
supporting him and therefore was unwilling to make reforms. When that
commitment seemed to waver in the late 1950s, he began to make some changes.
Similarly, in the 1970s and 1980s, Marcos received aid from the United States in part
because the United States did not wish to see his government fall to a communist
insurrection.
Fifth, foreign bilateral and multilateral assistance appears to have improved
education and health regardless of the overall policy environment. Still, the right
policy environment is likely to make investments in human capital more effective.
With respect to economic growth, the case of Korea suggests that foreign aid can
play a modest and positive role in promoting development in a favorable economic
environment. The opposite argument is less clear. On the one hand, foreign
assistance given to countries with unfavorable economic policies—Rhee's Korea,
Marcos's Philippines—may contribute to development, for example, by building
necessary infrastructure. On the other hand, to the extent that foreign aid sustained
the Marcos government and helped keep it in power longer, foreign aid may have
actually harmed the development of the Philippines because of the destructive effect
of that government's policies.
These cases also suggest that a strong base of human capital is not enough.
Education alone, for example, was insufficient to generate growth in the Philippines.
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Both South Korea and the Philippines have had well-educated populations for
decades, but Korea's economy has grown at a dramatic rate and the Philippines' has
not.
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